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Illusions - a model of mind
Markos Maniatis
UBB, Departamento de Ciencias Basicas, Chillan, Chile
Recognizing that all mental processes have to be unfree and passive, we develop a model of
behavior and perceptions. We shall see how misleading our intuition is and shall understand how
consciousness arises.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are convinced to be like the captain of a ship
- equipped with navigation systems like radar, depth
sounder on the one hand und rudder, radio equipment,
switches and levers for valves and locks on the other hand.
Similar, we get on the one hand visual, auditive, haptic
and other sensory informations and on the other hand
we control and steer our body, walk, grasp, gesticulate
und communicate. We are convinced to be free in the
sense, to indeed have informations available about our
surrounding and our body, but at least expect to be able
to control ourselves to a certain level arbitrary. Of course,
we know that certain processes are unconscious, like, for
instance, the control of our heart. However, we expect to
be free at least with respect to conscious behavior.
This picture of a ”captain” on board of our body re-
veals at a closer look as an illusion; on general grounds it
appears to be meaningless to present the sensory signals
to any kind of inner ”captain”; our senses have accom-
plished this task already in transferring the perceptions
to our nervous system, that is, have made the informa-
tion accessible for further processing. Why should these
informations be presented once again to an inner ”cap-
tain” [1]? In particular, the informations would have
to be processed once again within the ”captain” and we
were no step further. In fact, the incoming signals, for
instance of the visual system, are processed already be-
hind the retina and are directed to different regions in
the cortex. Accordingly, there is no localisation in our
brain in which the visual signals converge. Obviously, we
have to abandon the illusion of a ”captain”. But how
does this illusion arise?
A further illusion of the ”captain” is his freedom: we
think of a ”captain”, who has information available for
instance on monitors, about the current position of the
ship and its velocity, but we imagine that the ”captain”
is in principle free. We expect the ”captain” to balance
different options and to have a certain range of possibili-
ties to decide and act. In this sense we speak of a kind of
responsibility of the ”captain”. We will see that also this
freedom of the ”captain” is an illusion when we consider
the ”captain” in our nervous system.
The absence of our freedom is the crucial point in order
to understand our behavior, thinking, our perceptions,
and eventually consciousness. The quest for free will is
certainly very old [2, 3] - and it is still subject to discus-
sions today. In section II we shall discuss in detail this
question about our freedom.
Historically it seemed to be obvious that we are not
free, since two break thoughts have been achieved in sci-
ence: firstly, it became clear that physiological processes
are in principle not different from other natural phenom-
ena [4]. Secondly, the principle of cause and effect, the
determinism, was recognized as a fundamental and uni-
versal principle. These two findings lead to the following
question: how could we be free, if our physiological pro-
cesses have to follow the principle of cause and effect,
that is, are deterministic processes? We want to discuss
some aspects of this discussion in the section II and we
will argue that our freedom is an illusion, in a certain
sense independent of the question of determinism.
If we are not free, the question arises, how do we come
to our decisions and actions? Since the free ”captain” in
us turns out to be an illusion, the question is, how do we
steer our ship without any type of ”captain”? Obviously
it appears that we in general do not behave like a ghost
ship - we act in general purposively. As a consequence
of the absence of freedom it is required to replace the
”captain” by a non-free, that is, passive ”mechanism”
in order to understand our decisions and actions consis-
tently. This ”mechanism” has to connect the incoming
signals from our perceptions, which arrive at our nervous
system with the outgoing ones, which represent our de-
cisions and actions. In section III we shall present the
”mechanism” which allows us to replace the ”captain”
and shall give a consistent explanation of our behavior
and thinking.
In section IV we will focus on our perceptions. If we,
for instance, watch the sunset our sensation seems not to
be in accordance with electrical action potential in the
neurons of our nervous system. With other words, the
question arises, how does the electric action-potential ac-
tivity of neurons correspond to the sensation of watching
a sunset? What is the meaning of pain when we cut
accidentally our skin with a knife in contrast to the elec-
trical or biochemical neuronal activity? We recognize the
problem already when we ask the simple question of the
sensation of a color, say red: the color red corresponds
physically to a range of wave length of an electromag-
netic wave. This electromagnetic wave excites charges to
oscillate in special cells in our retina which in turn induce
electrical actions potentials in the neurons. The signals
are transferred to the cortex and the whole processing in
our nervous system is performed in form of action poten-
tials. The color red, in form of our sensation, seems to
not exist neither outside nor inside our brain. How do
we come to the illusion of the color red? In the literature
2this aspect of sensations of perceptions is often denoted
as qualia [5–8].
In section V we shall discuss eventually how we come
to the illusion of a ”captain”. It is the same question
asking for our ”consciousness”, ”self”, or ”I”. Why are
we convinced to have a form of ”I”? And what is the
true meaning of ”consciousness”? Based on the preced-
ing discussion about freedom and about decisions and
acts we shall arrive at an interesting model of mind. The
mathematician G. W. Leibnitz has discussed this ques-
tions about consciousness already centuries ago [9]. In
his monade 17 he is studying the question about con-
sciousness comparing our brain with a mill. We want to
reconsider this remarkable thought experiment and shall
try to reveal the Nature of consciousness.
It is our aim to develop a consistent model of mind
which provides a principal understanding of perceptions,
actions and eventually consciousness. We shall reveal
the illusions we have in mind and the main focus will be
to show how and why these illusions arise. Let us em-
phasize, that we are looking for a basic model of mind,
which will not consider all the interesting details. For
example, when we discuss our actions, in a general sense
also reflexes belong to actions. But reflexes occur in a
very different manner than conscious actions like shoot-
ing a ball towards a goal. Reflexes follow inevitable on a
certain stimulus; they are ”wired” firmly and they follow
therefore a different principle than when we shoot a ball.
But reflexes do not appear to be in contradiction to our
imagination, since we accept them as ”mechanical”.
We will see that our imagination is very misleading
compared to our true nature. We shall see, how in our
model of mind these illusionary imaginations arise and
shall understand how consciousness appears.
II. UNFREE WILL
The central point in the development of a model of
mind is to realize that the freedom of will is an illusion.
The old quest for freedom is still today subject to discus-
sions with very different opinions. This quest for freedom
was discussed already by the ancient greeks Democritus
[2] and Aristotele [3], newer discussion can be found, for
instance, by [1, 10–16],
In general we are convinced to be masters of our actions
and thoughts, to weight and eventually decide freely. A
consequence of this imagination of freedom is our under-
standing of responsibility and guilt, concepts which are
deeply rooted in our fundamental law; being guilty of a
criminal offense means to commit a violation of criminal
law. Finally, to a more or less large extend, our under-
standing of good and evil, responsibility, guilt and atone
are related to religion: if we violate God’s law we sin
and are guilty. Despite this big historical heritage with
respect to the body-mind problem we shall argue, that
under simple assumptions we never can be free. First,
we have to define what we mean by free. Let us consider
a concrete example: suppose, a waiter offers two kinds of
muffins, say a vanilla and a chocolate muffin. We choose
one of both, say the chocolate muffin. If this choice were
free this means that we could, at the same time, that is,
under the exact same conditions, have made an alterna-
tive choice. In this example we mean to be free, when we
could have chosen the vanilla muffin instead. We prelim-
inary define freedom as the capability to have made an
alternative choice, under the same conditions. We will
see that this definition not quite gives what we actually
expect from freedom; therefore we denote this definition
as preliminary.
Let us note that in praxis it is not possible to restore
the exact same conditions since this would require to go
back in time. Could we repeat the ”experiment” of the
choice of two types of muffins, we would be able to im-
mediately verify whether we always take the same choice
or not. However, we will see that this is not necessary to
understand that we are not free.
At a first glance, it appears not questionable that we,
following our definition, do have the freedom to choose
the alternative vanilla muffin. But looking at it again this
appears to be impossible, at least under certain assump-
tions: we suppose that our nervous system follows the
same basic principles as the rest of Nature does. In de-
tail these principles are electromagnetic and biochemical
interactions in the neurons and its joints, the synapses.
If we follow natural processes, then the choice of a muf-
fin is the result of a cascade of preceding processes. Every
process conditions the following. When we have made
a choice, while we extend our arm towards the choco-
late muffin, then this choice arises from preceding (elec-
tromagnetic and biochemical) processes. An alternative
choice means that there were alternative preceding pro-
cesses present, what obviously was not the case.
This argumentation is the determinism, the principle
of cause and effect. Our choice appears to be determined,
that is, not free, because we could not have taken an-
other choice under the same conditions or equivalently,
at the same time. Let us mention that this contradicts
our imagination of free will. We will come back to this
interesting point later.
Firstly, let us consider the assumption that we follow
natural processes. Nowadays we undestand the elemen-
tary biochemical and electromagnetic processes in our
nervous system. Even that we certainly do not under-
stand our brain as a whole, we do understand its basic el-
ementary units, the neurons, together with its joints, the
synapses. Electromagnetic action potentials are trans-
mitted through the neurons and in response, neurotrans-
mitters, that is, signaling molecules, are released and ex-
cite the receptors of another neuron. Obviously, the basic
interactions, that is, its biochemical processes are prin-
cipally the same interactions as we observe in Nature
elsewhere.
A milestone in this context was the synthetic produc-
tion of urea. Before, the chemistry of life, the organic
chemistry, was strictly separated from the non-organic
3chemistry of the remaining, dead, substances. This re-
flected the idea that chemistry of life is fundamentally
different from that of other substances. With the syn-
thetic production of urea in 1828 by Wo¨hler [4], that is,
the production of an organic substance from non-organic
substances, this distinction had to be given up. The
chemists today denote the molecules based on carbon
for historical reasons as organic chemistry, in contrast
to non-organic chemistry. This is certainly a strong ev-
idence supporting our assumption. A further evidence
that we follow natural processes is that material influ-
ences change our thoughts and actions. An example of
this is the consumption of alcohol. We recognize the
close relation between the material substance alcohol and
mind. A further example of this close relation is given
by lesion of certain areals of the brain which result in
mental changes. But let us note, that the assumption,
that our nervous system is based exclusively on natu-
ral interactions is plausible but difficult to prove. We
will nevertheless make this assumption in our model of
mind and shall see that we can in deed understand our
thoughts and actions in principle.
Secondly, let us take a closer look at the principle of
cause and effect, the determinism. It reflects our daily
experience that every effect has a cause: if the stone
hits the window with sufficient momentum, the glass will
break. When a action potential arrives at a synapse, it
reveals a certain amount of neurotransmitters. However,
we know that this principle of cause and effect has funda-
mental limitations: quantum mechanics, discovered by E.
Schro¨dinger [17], tells us that under the exact same con-
ditions we can observe different effects. In Nature there
are processes which occur spontaneously. An example of
this is the decay of a radioactive element, which decays
spontaneously: if we observe two such radioactive atoms
they in general decay at different times. Before their de-
cay, both atoms are in every detail identical. The reason
is not, that we do not know the exact details of the in-
stable atoms, but merely it is Nature itself following this
rule. For a sufficient large number of radioactive atoms
we can only give the half-life time, the time after which
about half of the atoms have decayed. However, for a sin-
gle atom we can not know this time of decay, it appears
to be undeterminable. We can compare this with throw-
ing a coin. When we throw a coin sufficiently often, we
find that about half of them fall on one specific side. For
a single throw we can not determine the outcome with
certainty.
If we suppose, that our nervous system underlies the
same interactions as everything else we observe in Na-
ture, then we cannot exclude that there are spontaneous
processes. With other words, in the cascade of processes
it may happen that there appear processes which are not
determined. Hence, the processes in the nervous system
are natural but not necessarily determined! Following
our preliminary definition of freedom, that is, the ability
to make an alternative choice under the same conditions,
we appear to be free!
However, we have to realize that this kind of freedom
does not satisfy our idea of freedom. Obviously, consid-
ering a machine, employing a spontaneous mechanism,
for instance triggered by radioactive decays of instable
atoms, we would not call free, even that it satisfies our
defintion. Instead, what we mean by free is to make
an alternative choice under the same conditions but not
spontaneously or randomly. Therefore, let us define free-
dom eventually as the ability to take an alternative choice
under the same conditions but not spontaneously.
Accordingly, following this revised definition, our de-
cisions and actions are not free, supposed we underly
natural processes.
Let us comment on the current discussion about free-
dom. The physicist Max Planck was also engaged in the
quest of freedom [18, 19]. He realizes that the sponta-
neous, random processes do not make our actions free,
but he tries by a kind of ”inner” dialog to declare us
free. His argument can be sketched following our exam-
ple of the choice of muffins. Suppose the waiter offeres
the two types of muffin but we are accompanied by a
friend. We discuss with our friend the preferences of the
two muffins. Evidently this discussion will influence the
process of decision and this may result eventually in an
alternative choice. Max Planck states that this process of
discussion can take place in our brain in a similar form
without our friend present and this makes us free, be-
cause, following Planck, this may result in an alternative
outcome. But there is a flaw in this argument: of course
the friend can affect our decision and we may even come
to an alternative choice. However, under the same con-
ditions, taking into account our friend, there appears no
alternative process, disregarding for the moment sponta-
neous processes. When we think of our friend as a kind
of a ”inner” dialog, we get again to an illusory kind of
”captain”. The ”inner” dialog in reality is part of the
cascade of processes which never can be free. As we have
argued, spontaneously processes do not change the argu-
ment, because ramdom processes do not count following
our definiton.
In the literature we can find many variants of this ar-
gumentation of Planck; see for instance [14, 15, 20–23].
Typically there appears a kind of ”captain” on board of
our body in order to save our freedom. The crucial point
is to realize the illusion of this kind of ”captain”.
We see, that in order to be free, there appears only
the possibility to reject the assumption that mind pro-
cesses are natural. We mentioned some evidences which
indicate that the interactions in our nervous system are
not anything special, compared to interactions elsewhere,
although it appears to be difficult to prove this. The ar-
gument to look for something beyond our nervous system
is essentially the believe in a ”soul” which is believed to
have some kind of existence beyond our body. Of course,
we can not accept this and will instead try to develop a
model of mind under the assumption that mind processes
do not go beyond natural processes elsewhere.
In section VI we shall briefly mention some conse-
4quences of the absence of freedom. In particular it might
appear to be unacceptable to be unfree since this contra-
dicts our imagination. We postpone this discussion after
we discuss in chapter V how we arrive at the illusion of
consciousness.
Let us close this section with an illustration by Carl
Ginet [12] who compared our illusion of freedom with
a little child in a ghost train: the child sits in a small
vehicle, equipped with a little unconnected, decorative
wheel. The child is moving the wheel in the illusion to
steer the vehicle which in reality is guided by the rails.
III. THINKING AND ACTING
For the moment we want to extend our findings with
respect to the lack of freedom to our thinking. So far we
have considered the freedom with respect to decisions,
like in the example of the two kinds of muffins. But
similar to our decisions, thoughts represent also natu-
ral processes, at least relying on our assumption that all
processes in our nervous system are of the same nature
as processes elsewhere. Without knowledge about the
detailed realization of thoughts in our nervous system
we therefore assume that they represent neuronal pro-
cesses. Strictly speaking it is in this context irrelevant
that thoughts are neuronal processes, it is only relevant
to assume that they are any kind of natural processes.
Then, our argumentation with respect to our decisions
can directly be applied to our thoughts; thoughts follow
from a cascade of processes, disregarding for the moment
spontaneous processes. Any process of thinking is pre-
ceded by a cascade of other processes, which in turn de-
termine this thinking.
Similar to our definition of freedom of decisions we
mean by free thinking the capability to develop an al-
ternative thinking under the same conditions, but not in
a spontaneous way. We see that in analogy to decisions
there is no freedom in our thoughts.
We see how misleading our illusion of a free ”captain”
is. The freely acting and thinking ”captain” is to aban-
don. Let us emphasize the passivity of the process of
thinking: at a closer look it is not ”us”, who develop this
or that thought, but the thoughts appears in a passive
way in our nervous system. An active form of thinking,
the creation of thoughts, in contrast, would correspond
to a kind of illusionary ”captain”. How could a thought
arise, if not caused by other processes, respectively spon-
taneously? While I am writing these lines, it is in fact my
nervous system, generating this thoughts - it is not my
autonomous ”I” in a sense of a ”captain”, who develops
this thoughts.
In detail, the process of thinking is certainly very com-
plicated, for instance, it is affected by experiences and
memories. These experiences go back probably to our
earliest childhood. In addition we are typically con-
fronted with many perceptions, for instance, a sound
which distracts us. Nevertheless, these details should
not obscure the fact that thinking is a passive, unfree
process.
We shall look closer at the Nature of thinking in sec-
tion V, but we already see, that under the plausible and
simple assumption, that thinking is represented by nat-
ural processes, thinking is as little free as actions and
decisions.
If actions, decisions and thoughts are unfree, the ques-
tion arises, how they are developed instead? The ques-
tion is, what instead of a ”captain” is the principal, un-
free ”mechanism” between the ”input” given by the mon-
itors, the echo sounder and so forth, and the output, that
is, the steering of the ship.
Let us fist consider as an example a reflex, which is in
a general sense a kind of action. For a reflex it is imme-
diate to see the principal unfree ”mechanism”: when the
rubber hammer hits the sensor area at the kneecap then
we move our lower leg. The evolution has equipped us
with reflexes in order to react fast and the reflex connects
the incoming signals going towards our nervous system
with the outgoing signals, the motor function given by
the muscle contraction. In the example of a reflex we
recognize immediately that the action is not free: the
movement follows inevitably on the stimulus. However,
this action does not contradict our imagination. We ac-
cept the reflex as ”mechanical”, in accordance with real-
ity.
In general, our actions are not reflexes and we can in
general adapt our actions to changing circumstances. In
case of the choice of the muffin the ”mechanism” appears
to be more complicated and this ”mechanism” is of course
not a reflex. We weigh the advantages and disadvantages,
have memories, experiences, visual perceptions and many
more aspects which lead to our decision. What is the
principle, or the ”mechanism”, which has to be passive
and cannot be free, in order to reach the decision?
We propose that our system of desire and pain sig-
nals provides the fundamental principle. The principle,
we postulate, is to maximize desire signals and minimize
pain signals. We will see that actions can arise based on
this principle as required in an unfree manner. Reflexes
are excluded from this principle, as discussed already.
Considering once again the choice of muffins, the even-
tual choice corresponds to stronger desire signals: our ex-
periences, memories, the visual impression and so forth
guide our nervous system to the choice, because it is ac-
companied by stronger desire signals than the alternative
choice. Maybe, having chosen the chocolate muffin, we
are disappointed, because the taste does not meet our
expectations. We will memorize this experience and this
may lead to an alternative choice in the future. Let us
note that we are talking about desire signals and pain
signals and not about desire and pain in order to empha-
size the ”mechanism”. The sensation or the experience
of desire and pain will be discussed later in section IV. To
summarize, we postulate that the principal ”mechanism”
of our nervous system is to reach certain signals and to
avoid others.
5Some remarks are in order: apparently, the principle
of maximizing desire signals and minimizing pain signals
is often not immediately obvious. However we want to
emphasize that it nevertheless may be the basic principle
- excluding reflexes. If we are hungry this is a pain signal
which we avoid, when we eat. We take care of our body,
avoid injuries and other forms of dangers, following this
principle. But if we get up early in the morning and go
to work, we can ask, where we can see this principle?
But of course, we have made the experience that based
on this habit we keep our job. This is in the long term
reflected by a regular salary and other benefits, which
indirectly correspond to more desire signals. In most
cases we do not follow this basic ”mechanism” directly,
but by a closer look we can nevertheless recognize it as
a fundamental principle. Even when we share our meal
with someone, this can be seen as a gain of desire signals:
we have experienced, for instance, that it is advantageous
for us to share since we expect that if we do so others will
also share with us.
Of course we see the difference between reflexes and
other actions based on the gain of desire signals (together
with the avoidance of pain signals). Reflexes are fixed,
firmly wired, and do not allow to adapt our behavior
to changing circumstances. We move the lower leg con-
stantly, when the hammer triggers the stimulus. But
if we have bad experiences with the chocolate muffin,
we will probably take an alternative choice. Learning as
a change of behavior due to experiences is not possible
with reflexes, but certainly following the principle of de-
sire and pain signals. Both principles have in common
that we can understand them as unfree ”mechanisms”,
as required.
We can illustrate the principle of maximizing desire sig-
nals and minimizing pain signals with a chess programm:
the chess programm calculates different variants of pos-
sible moves and values the different positions reached in
memory. It then chooses the movement corresponding
to the highest value. This is similar to the choice of the
muffin where we ”value” both possible moves and choose
the muffin corresponding to the highest ”value”, that is,
desire signal.
Let us in this context consider a rat experiment per-
formed by James Olds and Peter Milner [24]. In this
experiment an electrode was put into a certain areal of
the brain of a rat. The rat itself can release an electric
signal to this electrode by pressing a button. Before, the
rat has been trained to use another button which triggers
a mechanism such that feed drops into the box of the rat.
In the experiment the rat presses the button connected
to the electrode continuously. The rat does not consider
the other botton to the point of exhaustion. We easily
understand this based on our principle of desire signals.
The electrode hits obviously an area of the nervous sys-
tem triggering a strong desire signal.
We may argue that this experiment shows the princi-
ple in rats and not in humans. But considering persons
addicted to drugs, we recognize parallels. These people
typically lose their job, neglect social relationships, and
often have a tendency to crime - only in order to gain the
desire signal, triggered by drugs. The brain has found a
fatal way to maximize desire signals. This may explain,
by the way, why it is so difficult to get people addicted
to drugs to give up this destructive way.
There is no contradiction if we consider someone who
hurts himself on purpose. If the pain signal is over com-
pensated by a desire signal this can be understood based
on our principle. Many actions may appear to not follow
this principle on the first sight, but at a closer inspec-
tion we can recognize its underlying mechanism at work.
As has been mentioned, reflexes are excluded from this
principle.
Moreover, we have seen that a ”mechanism” is required
in order to explain our actions. Which fundamental prin-
ciple do we have available except from our system of de-
sire and pain signals? We can also ask what is the mean-
ing of this sophisticated system of pain and desire signals
other than providing a mechanism of assessment? Hence,
it appears to be exactly the required principle to replace
the inner ”captain”. This principle explains our actions
and decisions in a consistent and unfree, that is passive
manner. To summarize, we postulate in our model of
mind that the principle, maximizing desire signals and
minimizing pain signals is the basic principle of actions
and decisions apart from reflexes.
IV. PERCEPTION
Suppose we watch the sunset with its deeply red sky.
We know that this perception of a color is another illu-
sion: before the light hits our retina, it is an electromag-
netic wave in a certain range of wavelength. Of course,
nothing of the electromagnetic wave is red. In the retina,
the incoming wave excites charges to oscillate in special-
ized cells. In turn these cells transform the incoming sig-
nal into an electric action potential [25]. The complete
remaining processing proceeds in neurons in terms of ac-
tion potentials which seem to have nothing to do with the
sensation of the color red. Neither we can understand the
sensation relying on an inner ”captain” who could get the
signals presented on a kind of inner screen. As we have
seen in the discussion in section II, this ”captain” is an
illusion.
Moreover, the stimulus, after being translated into the
”language” of the nervous system, that is, being available
in form of action potentials, is already decomposed on its
way to the cortex and gets to different separated areas.
Of course, the signals do not converge anywhere but are
processed further.
What is then our perception of the color red? We real-
ize how difficult this is to answer, if we try to explain the
color red to a blind person (someone who was born blind
so that he/she has never experienced this sensation). It
appears to be impossible. This problematic can be ex-
tended to other sensation in an analogous way, and we
6see that all our perceptions appear to be illusions.
The guiding principle to reveal the nature of percep-
tions is the finding that this process is required to be
passive and can not be free. Free or active would mean
that the perception is ”internally” represented to a kind
of ”captain” on a kind of screen. Suppose there would be
an inner representation, then, this representation would
have to be watched by some kind of ”inner eye” and
we arrive at a senseless loop, also known as infinite
regress [1]. Since the perception has to be a passive
process we have to replace the ”captain” by a passive
”mechanism”.
Of course we know that the meaning of perception is
to adapt our behavior to the surrounding. With our find-
ings in the last section we know that perceptions serve
to provide informations such that our system of gaining
desire signals and avoiding pain signals generates actions
and decisions. Hence, we have to consistently explain
perceptions satisfying the following requirements:
• Perceptions cannot be any form of ”inner” repre-
sentation.
• Perceptions have to be a passive process.
• Perceptions have to satisfy the functionality to get
informations, eventually in order to adapt our be-
havior.
If we ask ourselves what is red, we would describe this
perception in the following or similar way: the color red
is the color of an apple, of the sunset, of the ember of
fire, our blood and we think of red when we listen to
the sound red or read the word red. Obviously we find
that we associate the perception with a bunch of other
sensations. We immediately see that these associations
indeed satisfy all the mentioned requirements. Therefore
we postulate that these associations are the perception
which is triggered by the initial stimulus. Building asso-
ciations to the stimulus given by red light, occurs without
any kind of inner representation, is a passive process, and
provide us with information about our surrounding.
Let us now consider an auditory perception, when we
for example press the key of a piano keyboard. In an anal-
ogous way to the visual perception, the sound waves are
nothing but fluctuations of pressure in the air which are
transformed into action potentials in the hearing. What
is then in a passive form the sensation when we listen to
the sound of a piano?
We associate the auditory signal with a bunch of sen-
sations, for instance the visual impression of a piano,
piano music in our memory, the visual perception of a
concert hall and certainly much more. The whole bunch
of associations, triggered by the initial stimulus is, as we
postulate, the sensation of the piano sound.
A blind person, without memories about visual sensa-
tions, has never experienced the color sensation red and
is therefore not able to build associations. Of course, we
see, that the perceptions are individually different and in
particular are influenced by culture. Accordingly, we ex-
pect that the Inuits in Greenland have certainly another
sensation of the color white than someone how grew up
closer to the equator.
A little child, told by his parents, ”The apple is red”,
”This toy is red” learns the perception, triggered by the
initial stimulus of light of a certain range of wavelength
by the association to the sound of the spoken word ”red”.
The child does accordingly not learn to recognize the
color red on a kind of screen, but learns the perception
itself, building associations.
We should mention that our system of perceptions
is remarkable sophisticated and typically gives very ex-
tended associations. But we are interested in the basic
principle here without considering all the details.
Eventually, let us consider the sensation of pain, for
instance, when we accidentally cut our skin with a knife.
In an analogous way the stimulus, triggered by special-
ized receptor cells in the skin, generates action potentials
which are transferred to our nervous system. But there
is a principal difference between these signals referring to
pain, and the visual perception for instance. The differ-
ence is, that our nervous system, stimulated by the cut,
tries to avoid this kind of signals. As we have seen in the
last section, our actions are driven by the passive prin-
ciple to avoid pain signals. This distinguishes desire and
pain sensations from all other perceptions, which are not
a part of our assessment system.
How do we explain the visual perception, when we con-
sider a landscape? We have discussed already, that the
landscape does not appear in form of an ”inner” represen-
tation. When we watch the landscape, we actually recog-
nize different details, a birch there or a cloud above and a
lodge over there. We associate different visual stimulus’
entering our eye from different directions with sounds
like ”birch”, or ”lodge”. All together we associate the
perception maybe with ”valley”, but for this to happen,
different details have to appear from different directions.
In fact we are not aware of many details, say, a horse,
which has been there all the time but only through its
whinnies got our attention and now compounds to our
sensation. The ”picture”, that is, the bunch of associa-
tions, has changed in this moment, even that the visual
stimulus has not. Our visual system is able to distinguish
different directions and locations and to recognize pat-
terns. We note that the visual system is very advanced.
This is reflected by the fact that the visual system in our
cortex occupies a large part. If we consider the photo of
a landscape, this photo does not show our ”inner” rep-
resentation, but the photo triggers a sensation which is
similar to the landscape itself. We therefore associate the
landscape with a ”picture” of it.
V. CONSCIOUSNESS
Let us start the discussion of consciousness following a
thought experiment by G. W. Leibniz from his monade
717; see for instance [9]:
Besides, it must be admitted that perception, and
anything that depends on it,
cannot be explained in terms of mechanistic causation –
that is,
in terms of shapes and motions.
Let us pretend that there was a machine, which was
constructed in
such a way as to give rise to thinking, sensing, and
having perceptions.
You could imagine it expanded in size (while retaining
the same proportions),
so that you could go inside it, like going into a mill.
On this assumption, your tour inside it would show you
the working parts pushing each other, but never
anything which
would explain a perception. So perception is to be
sought,
not in compounds (or machines), but in simple
substances.
Furthermore, there is nothing to be found in simple
substances,
apart from perceptions and their changes.
Again, all the internal actions of simple
substances can consist in nothing other than perceptions
and their changes.
We would like to reconsider Leibniz thought experi-
ment, presented about three centuries ago. Today we
know, that at a tour inside the elementary working parts
are the neurons, which are pushing each other by means
of electrical and biochemical activity. Following Leibniz
closely it is evident that we can not find at any special
location anything from which we could explain percep-
tion, sensing or thinking. This illusionary special location
of perception, sensing or thinking we have denoted as a
”captain” earlier. The illusion of a ”captain” corresponds
to our imagination of what we would call consciousness
or self or I.
We have seen, that any special location of perception,
sensing and thinking leads to contradictions: as Leibniz
argues, suppose, we could detect a special location, then,
in a further expansion in size we could again go inside
and would only find working parts, pushing each other.
Indeed, in terms of neurons, we know that the neuronal
signals do not converge anywhere. Besides, as we have
seen in section IV, any kind of convergence at some loca-
tion of perception would require some new kind of inner
”eye”.
Leibniz discusses two solutions, to understand con-
sciousness: firstly, looking for consciousness in the ”sim-
ple substance” itself, that is, from a modern point of
view, in the neurons itselves. However, we know that
the fundamental function of the neurons is to transmit
action potentials. This is consistent with our assumption
we have made in section II that the interactions in the
nervous system, based on electromagnetic and biochem-
ical processes, are in principle not different from Nature
elsewhere. Hence, we do not agree with the identification
of the ”simple substance” to be the location of conscious-
ness. But let us mention that nevertheless there are at-
tempts, following Leibniz, to understand consciousness
in the neurons itself; see for instance [14, 15, 21, 22, 26].
The second possibility, as Leibniz mentions, is to un-
derstand consciousness from the compound. Contrary to
Leibniz we want to follow this way, and try to undestand
consciousness like the phenomena of perceptions, sensing,
and thinking from the interplay of the neurons.
Realizing that perception, sensing, and thinking ap-
pear from the cascade of neuronal processes in an unfree
manner we talk about the emergence of these phenomena.
Using the expression emergence we emphasize that per-
ceptions, sensing, and thinkings are as required passive
processes.
Let us think about this point further. Imagine, under
anesthetic, one neuron after the other would be replaced
by an exact copy. Of course, in practise this is not pos-
sible, but let us consider this as a thought experiment.
Since no neuron would be a special location of perception,
sensing or thinking, we would in no step replace this spe-
cial location simply because this location does not exist.
The essential point is to see that every neuron is nothing
more then a ”mechanical” device which is replaced by an
equivalent one.
After recovering from anesthesia we would not recog-
nize any change. The neurons would interact in the same
manner as before and our perception, sensing, and think-
ing would appear in the same way. Here we see clearly
the illusion of our imagination of we. Following our mis-
leading imagination we would expect that at a certain
point our we would have been removed, that is, the illu-
sionary ”captain” we expect has left the ship. In reality,
there is no ”captain” who could leave.
Of course, it makes no difference whether we replace
the neurons one by one, or all at once. Evidently, this
means that, replaced by a copy, we would develop per-
ception, sensing, and thinking in the same way! Hence,
suppose that under anesthetic our body is replaced by
a copy, nothing like I or consciousness or self would be
lost. That is, our perception, sensing, and thinking is
not attached to certain neurons, but appear from their
processes. The emergence of our thinking, sensing and
actions is clearly seen as originating form the interplay
of neurons in this thought experiment.
Let us further imagine that we replace each neuron
in turn by an electronic device, which replicates exactly
the functionality of the original neuron. As before we
would not remove in any step a location of perception,
sensing or thinking. In this way we eventually would be
replaced by a machine under anesthetic and this machine
would develop the same perception, sensing and thinking
and we could not feel any difference! In the circuit there
would emerge the same processes as before - supposed the
electronic devices work like the original neurons. We rec-
8ognize that our imagination is contrary to the emergence
of perception, sensing and thinking. We are convinced to
have some kind of I – a location where perception, sens-
ing, and thinking is formed. Why are we subject to this
illusion?
The question is how do we come to this illusion of con-
sciousness or ”self” or ”I” [27]? In order to understand
this, let us see how the I appears in our thoughts. To
this end let us consider an example of a perception, for
instance the smell of an apple. If we communicate to
someone this perception, we say, for instance: “I smell
the scent of a fresh apple”. We use grammatical first-
person in order to communicate our own perception, dis-
tinguishing it from a perception of someone else. In con-
trast, with the communication of ”She smells the scent
of a fresh apple” we use grammatically third-person in
order to denote the sensation of a third person.
But what happens if we do not communicate this state-
ment but only realize the smell? As we have discussed,
this thinking must be emergent, that is, occur in a passive
manner. We postulate now that thinking is nothing but
silent communication. Thinking then represents a com-
munication actually directed to another person. When
we smell the scent of a fresh apple, then we associate
the sensation with the silent communication ”I smell the
scent of a fresh apple”.
First of all we see, that thinking in this form occurs in
a passive way, as required by our findings. We further
see, that we have to use grammatical first-person in the
thought. We silently communicate our sensation and not
the sensation of someone else. The first person ”I” ap-
pears inevitably in our thought. This ”I” or ”self” is the
same as our consciousness.
In this way the illusion of a location of perception,
sensing, and thinking appears automatically - a machine
would develop the same illusion of a location of percep-
tion, sensing, and thinking. We understand now what
would happen in the copy of our nervous system in terms
of an equivalent electrical device: in the copy would in a
passive manner emerge the same illusion of ”I”. Our copy
would be convinced to be conscious, it would associate
the same silent communication using grammatical first-
person - compare with the “zombie” in [10]. The machine
would be equivalent, and just as litte a ”zombie” as we -
or with equal right we would be as much a ”zombie” as
the machine.
Now we can easily understand what it means to be
aware of something: being aware of the scent of a fresh
apple means that there emerge associations to the silent
communication. If we are conscious of a sensation we
communicate it, but not necessarily verbalize this asso-
ciation.
Let us consider another example, for instance the hap-
tic sensation at our soles of our feet. Before we have
read these lines, we were probably not aware of this sen-
sation. This we can now understand easily. Triggered
by the words written here, in particular ”haptic sensa-
tion” and ”soles” we associate the perception with the
silent communication of the form: ”I feel the ground at
the soles of my feet”. Since it is a silent communication,
we use grammatical first-person and it appears the illu-
sion of an I. Before we have read these lines, we were
not aware of this sensation, even that the stimulus was
constantly there. What was missing was the association
with the silent communication.
If we think about something, we imagine to develop
these thinkings. We realize that thinking happens to be
in reality very different: thinking revealed as a passive
process emerges in form of silent communication - if ”I”
cannot concentrate, this means that the emergent think-
ing does not follow a certain subject.
Let us emphasize that it appears in principal possible
to copy our ”I” on a machine. What appears in the ma-
chine would not be a copy - it would be ourself. Our
perception, sensing, and thinking would appear in the
same manner in the copy. As we have argued, our ”I”
would not be lost in the process of copying. Of course,
nowadays computers are not sufficiently sophisticated to
simulate the tens of billions of neurons, but there are al-
ready attempts - see for instance [28]. Let us summarize
what he have found: our ”self” or ”I” is an illusion in
the following sense, it is not the ”I” that wakes up in the
morning, thinks and feels, but it is passive communica-
tions that inevitable emerges involving the grammatical
first-person.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen how misleading our imaginations about
our mind are: under the assumption that the processes in
our nervous system are basically the same as in Nature
elsewhere we find that our freedom is an illusion. We
have seen that we have to understand perceptions and
likewise actions and thoughts as passive processes. The
imagination of a ”captain” on board of our body has to
be abandoned. Our behavior, we have argued, follows
the principle of maximizing desire signals and minimiz-
ing pain signals. This ”mechanism” we have identified
replacing our illusionary ”captain”. We understand con-
sciousness which appears in a form of silent communi-
cation as a passive process as required. Eventually, we
arrive at a model of mind which at a glance may appear
to reduce us to will-less ”machines”. But what if we are
”machines”?
However, we should realize how powerfull these ”ma-
chines” are. These machines have composed the St
Matthew Passion (see for instance the discussion in [29])
and are investigating the Universe. Artificial machines
are far away from these achievements. We are made of a
vast amount of neurons, equipped with dedicated sensors
and very complex motor functions. Robots appear to be
ridiculous compared to us, even that they already play
better chess than every human, recognize speech and can
build associations artificially.
Let us note that as a consequence of our findings, con-
9cepts like responsibility and guilt have no meaning if we
are not free. How could we be guilty or be responsible for
something if we do not have a choice? We obviously have
to think these concepts of guilt and responsibility over.
Suppose someone steals a bike, then we actually can not
blame the thief, but still we can blame the action itself.
We have seen that thoughts appear in a passive man-
ner and in reality, we are not able to create thoughts
in a free way. This could be misunderstood as a kind
of compulsive behavior. But compulsive behavior refers
to a mental disorder which is characterized by repetitive
actions or thoughts. This is quite different from the re-
quired passivity of thoughts and actions. We are not free
in our actions and thinking but this is by no means a
compulsive behavior since this is in general not a repeti-
tive process.
The concept of creativity, in a inspirational sense of
thinking, has certainly to be given up. The process of
new insights and ideas is merely a synthesis, which origi-
nates from the vast amount of impressions and memories.
This is the price we have to pay for giving up freedom.
The creator in us would be nothing but the illusionary
”captain”.
Eventually, there arises an interesting feature: replaced
by a machine, we could be become immortal, supposed it
is possible to exactly simulate tens of billions of neurons.
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